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Dignitatis Humanae:  
Public Funding and Divesting  
of Faith Schools in a Liberal State
This article examines a largely overlooked element of Dignitatis Humanae:, that is, its relevance for the question of whether or not the State has a 
duty to fund faith schools. To this end the fragmentary remarks of a number 
of commentators are examined, as well as the text, context and dra!ing of the 
Declaration itself. Dignitatis Humanae is also compared to another Vatican 
II document in this regard, namely Gravissimum Educationis. "e analysis is 
extended to an area which has not, so far as the authors are aware, been explicitly 
dealt with by moral theologians: the question of whether there could be a duty 
of the Church to divest itself of control of some of its schools and transfer them 
to the State. 
A Neglected Section
Widely regarded as one of the most important documents of Vatican Council 
II, the Declaration on Religious Liberty (Dignitatis Humanae, herea!er DH) is 
best known for endorsing the right of human persons (acting individually and 
in association) to “religious freedom” (ad libertatem religiosam, DH, no.2).1 "is 
right has a dual dimension: it protects the person qua citizen from being forced to 
act contrary to his “beliefs” (conscientiam)2 concerning “matters religious” (in re 
 * "omas Finegan is a lecturer at the Department of "eology and Religious Studies, Mary 
Immaculate College, Ireland; and Eamonn Conway is head of the same Department.
 1 Unless otherwise indicated the “Abbott” translation of the documents of Vatican Council II 
is used in this article; see !e Documents of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott (London: Chapman, 
1966).
 2 "e “Flannery” translation of the documents of Vatican Council II tends to refer to 
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religiosa), while, subject to the exigencies of public order, it also protects him from 
being restrained from acting in accordance with these beliefs. !e claim-right to 
religious freedom corresponds to the negative duty of others - individuals, social 
groups and the State (potestas civilis)3 - to refrain from coercion and interference. 
All this has been the subject of very extensive commentary. Much less noted is 
the relevance of DH for something that at "rst blush seems only dimly related to 
the right to religious freedom: the matter of whether the State has a positive duty 
to fund faith schools.4 DH no.5 is the locus of the matter:
Since the family is a society in its own original right, it has the right freely to live 
its own domestic religious life under the guidance of parents. Parents, moreover, 
have the right to determine, in accordance with their own religious beliefs, the 
kind of religious education that their children are to receive. Government, in 
consequence, must acknowledge the right of parents to make a genuinely free 
choice of schools and of other means of education. !e use of this freedom 
of choice is not to be made a reason for imposing unjust burdens on parents, 
whether directly or indirectly. Besides, the rights of parents are violated if their 
children are forced to attend lessons or instructions which are not in agreement 
with their religious beliefs. !e same is true if a single system of education, from 
which all religious formation is excluded, is imposed upon all. 
Quite clearly, DH regards it as contrary to parental rights for the State to 
“impose” a single, thoroughly secularist system of education on all families, as it 
is for the State to “force” children to attend classes not in conformity with their 
parents’ religious beliefs. But from neither of these propositions does it follow that 
the State has a duty to fund faith schools. !e matter at hand hinges on whether 
a State’s refusal to fund faith schools constitutes an “unjust burden” on parents’ 
interest in a “genuinely free choice of schools.” Yet the answer to this question is 
itself contingent on the prior question of right - if there is no right to the public 
“convictions”; see Vatican Council II: the Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, ed. Austin 
Flannery (Dublin: Dominican Publicatons, 1996).
 3 !e Abbott translation refers to “government” whereas the Flannery translation refers to 
“civil authority.” !is article employs the term “State” instead. 
 4 By “faith school” is meant a school controlled by a religious denomination and which 
possesses an ethos constituted by the faith professed by the religious denomination in question. 
By “public funding” is meant a very signi"cant State contribution to the costs of running and 
maintaining a school. While the public funding of a school should make it "nancially feasible 
for all children to attend it, it does not exclude the possibility that parents are expected to make 
some small contribution towards the school or towards the provision of books and uniforms for 
their children. 
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funding of schools characterized by the ethos of one’s religious denomination,5 then 
the withholding of such funding by the State is, at least prima facie, compatible 
with justice. !ere is, a"er all, a clear sense in the fact that being permitted by the 
State to send one’s children to a privately funded school constitutes a free choice 
of schools. Nevertheless, it can be questioned whether such a system provides 
parents of lesser means with a genuinely free choice of school, and whether it 
places upon them not simply a burden (which it obviously does) but an unjust 
burden. 
What little commentary6 there is on the implications of DH for the public 
funding of faith schools fails to present a consensus view. Some authors skim over 
the issue: Giuseppe Alberigo’s #ve-volume history of Vatican II merely repeats that 
special mention is made of the right of families to rear their children in accordance 
with their religious convictions, a right which “implies the acceptance of parents’ 
choices in the schooling of their children.”7 Some other authors imply that DH 
avoids the issue altogether: Russell Hittinger considers that the relevant section of 
DH “prescinds, for the most part, from concrete matters of policy, where con$icts 
inevitably arise.”8 Likewise, Richard Regan argues that the section does not 
attempt to identify concrete cases that constitute “unjust” burdens on freedom 
of parental choice in education.9 Another position taken is that DH permits, but 
does not require, the State to fund faith schools. In treating of the call in DH no.3 
to show religion “favour,” Robert George states that the State “can” (as distinct 
from “should”) collaborate with religious schools;10 in a later piece co-written with 
William Saunders, and this time in the context of the State’s duty (a%rmed in DH 
no.6) to “help create conditions favourable to the fostering of religious life,” he 
says that the State “may” provide aid to religious schools.11 (George’s analysis of 
 5 !e right in question is here understood to be quali#ed by the need to demonstrate a 
su%cient level of parental support for a particular type of school.
 6 From the outset DH no.5 provoked relatively little interest from commentators. By way of 
example, the index to one of the very earliest commentaries on DH shows that only one other 
section (no.10) receives lesser scrutiny throughout the work. Yves Congar, ed., Vatican II: La 
liberté religieuse (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1967), 279. 
 7 Giuseppe Alberigo, History of Vatican II (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 5:454-455.
 8 Russell Hittinger, “!e Declaration on Religious Liberty Dignitatis Humanae,” in Vatican 
II: Renewal within Tradition, ed. Matthew L. Lamb and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 369.
 9 Richard J. Regan, Con"ict and Consensus: Religious Freedom and the Second Vatican Council 
(London: Macmillan, 1967), 106.
 10 Robert P. George, “Religious Liberty and Public Morality,” in In Defence of Natural Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 135.
 11 Robert P. George and William L. Saunders, “Dignitatis Humanae: !e Freedom of the 
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the matter completely omits mention of DH no.5, an indication of the extent to 
which the section is overlooked.)
Pietro Pavan deals with the matter in a more equivocal fashion. He argues 
that the parental rights enumerated in DH no.5 are violated if they are “formally 
recognized by law but are prevented from being exercised in fact,” something 
which occurs when “all members of a society without distinction are forced to 
contribute to an educational system designed for all, without being given the 
opportunity to educate their children according to their particular religious 
beliefs.”12 !is could be a circuitous way of saying that DH no.5 a"rms the duty 
of States to fund faith schools, but Pavan’s remarks can also be construed as 
meaning that the State ought not to coerce parents into contributing towards an 
educational model that is discordant with their religious beliefs. A clearer (though 
still not fully forthright) claim in favour of DH no.5 as articulating the relevant 
duty is provided by both Roman Siebenrock and Francis Canavan. On the basis 
of DH no.5 Siebenrock states that the right to religious self-determination on 
behalf of the family requires “the right to free choice of schools and the choice 
of appropriate means of education without encountering unjust burdens.”13 
Focusing on the term “unjust,” he opines that it means that “a certain readiness 
to exertion, realistically speaking, and preparedness for sacri#ce, realistically 
speaking, are inescapable. !at said, there are limits. !e State is called to 
neutrality (equality) of treatment in the educational arena and therefore must 
provide a pluralist educational system.”14 In a similar vein, Canavan argues that, 
at “the practical level,” the section “implies” a criticism of the American public 
school monopoly of tax support for elementary and secondary schools.15 Je$rey 
Gros takes an opposing position, suggesting that the #nal text of DH implies no 
such duty on behalf of States.16
Church and the Responsibility of the State,” in Catholicism and Religious Freedom: Contemporary 
Re"ections on Vatican II’s Declaration on Religious Liberty, ed. Kenneth L. Grasso and Robert P. 
Hunt (Lanham, MD: Sheed & Ward, 2006), 12.
 12 Pietro Pavan, “Declaration on Religious Freedom,” in Commentary on the Documents of 
Vatican II, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (London: Burns & Oats, 1969), 71.
 13 Roman Siebenrock, “!eologischer Kommentar zur Erklärung über die religiöse Freiheit 
Dignitatis Humanae,” in Herders #eologischer Kommentar zum Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil, 
ed. Peter Hünermann and Bernd Jochen Hilberath (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2005), 4:178.
 14 Ibid. 
 15 Francis P. Canavan, “Dignitatis Humanae, the Catholic Concept of the State, and Public 
Morality,” in Catholicism and Religious Freedom, 80.
 16 Je$rey Gros, “Dignitatis Humanae,” in Evangelization and Religious Freedom: Ad Gentes, 
Dignitatis Humanae, ed. Stephen B. Bevans and Je$rey Gros (New York: Paulist Press, 2009), 
182-183.
Public Funding and Divesting of Faith Schools – Conway  and Finegan 51
One of the few elements common to each of the foregoing interpretations 
is that none oer a sustained treatment of the issue: each view amounts to little 
more than an isolated assertion made independently of critical engagement with 
other relevant statements of DH and indeed Vatican II. In order to arrive at the 
most plausible interpretation of DH no.5 both these wider contexts require 
consideration. 
Gravissimum Educationis
While the meaning of one conciliar document cannot by itself determine 
how another is to be interpreted, it can act as a hermeneutic guide to other texts 
when it directly treats of an issue which is rather indirectly dealt with by them. 
And although none of the aforementioned studies makes the connection, the 
Declaration on Christian Education (Gravissimum Educationis, herea!er GE) 
most certainly does deal with the public funding of faith schools. "e matter 
was in fact one of the prime motives for the Council in addressing the topic 
of Christian education.17 "e #nal text of GE re$ects the fact that throughout 
debates over its various schemata numerous bishops had voiced criticism of a 
State monopoly on schools and expressed support for the public funding of faith 
schools.18 GE no.1 declares that since every man “is endowed with the dignity of 
a person, he has an inalienable right to an education corresponding to his proper 
destiny and suited to his native talents, his sex, his cultural background, and his 
ancestral heritage.” GE no.2 goes on to a%rm that every Christian “is entitled 
to a Christian education.” GE no.3 indicates that it is the partents who have the 
“most solemn obligation to educate their ospring” and who therefore must be 
acknowledged as the “#rst and foremost educators of their children.” "e section 
goes on to explain how the State, in discharging its duty to provide for the 
common good and to promote education, ought to oversee (tueri)19 “the duties 
and rights of parents and of others who have a role in education,” and provide 
them with assistance. When the eorts of parents and other organizations are 
insu%cient to complete the task of education the State should so complete it; 
however, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, this completion must 
proceed with “attention to parental wishes.” With this groundwork in place, GE 
no.6 pronounces,
 17 Johannes Pohlschneider, “Declaration on Christian Education,” in Commentary on the 
Documents of Vatican II, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler, 1-2.
 18 Alberigo, History of Vatican II, 5:199-209.
 19 "e “Flannery” translation uses the word “recognize.”
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Parents, who have the rst (primum)20 and the inalienable duty and right to 
educate their children, should enjoy true freedom in their choice of schools. 
Consequently, public authority, which has the obligation to oversee (tueri)21 and 
defend the liberties of citizens, ought to see to it, out of a concern for distributive 
justice, that public subsidies are allocated in such a way that, when selecting 
schools for their children, parents are genuinely free to follow their conscience. 
GE no.6 also goes on to propose that while it is the duty of the State to ensure 
that all citizens have access to an adequate education, the principle of subsidiarity 
requires that “no kind of school monopoly arises,” for such a monopoly “would 
militate against the native (nativis)22 rights of the human person, the development 
and spread of culture itself, the peaceful association of citizens, and the pluralism 
which exists today in very many societies.” Intertwined with this teaching are 
the propositions that the Church has a divine mandate to play a part in the 
development of the education of persons, a mandate sourced in its obligation 
to promote full human welfare, including spiritual welfare (GE preface and 
no.3); that the Church has a role in aiding the moral and religious education 
of its children in non-Catholic schools through the teaching and example of 
Catholic teachers (GE no.7), but its role is especially evident in Catholic schools 
wherein an atmosphere animated by a spirit of liberty and Gospel charity should 
be developed (GE no.8); and that the Church has the right to freely establish 
schools of all kinds, a right which is important for the protection of the right 
of parents to have their children educated according to their conscience (GE 
no.8). GE’s forthright recognition of States’ duty to fund faith schools hardly 
constituted a wholly novel teaching; for instance, Pope Leo XIII’s Immortale Dei 
(1885) already spoke of the importance to the public welfare of making public 
provisions for the instruction of youth in religion and true morality (no.43), 
while Pope Pius XI’s Divini Illius Magistri (1929) insisted that distributive 
justice requires the allocation of public nancial aid to Catholic schools (nos. 
81-82).
#ere is a very considerable overlap in how GE and DH no.5 approach the 
general issue of State support for parental choice in education. Both proceed along 
natural law (i.e. philosophical) lines; both emphasize the primacy of parental 
rights and duties; both accept the principle of subsidiarity in this context; and 
both are critical of a State monopoly in education. Moreover, GE no.6 appeals to 
“distributive justice” to require the allocation of public subsidies to faith schools, 
 20 Ibid. uses the word “primary.”
 21 Ibid. uses the word “protect.”
 22 Ibid. uses the word “natural.”
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while the determination of the position of DH no.5 on the precise matter hinges, 
as indicated above, on the question of what constitutes an “unjust” burden on 
parents, a matter obviously implying the justice of distributing various resources 
and burdens among citizens. Yet, this overlap tends to be ignored in academic 
commentary: Johannes Pohlschneider, who introduced the topic of schools 
into the conciliar debate on DH,23 makes no mention of it when, in the course 
of his in!uential commentary on GE, he refers to sections of DH containing 
“important elements with an educational aspect.”24 
!e Broader Teaching of Dignitatis Humanae
Strictly speaking, the right to religious freedom at the heart of DH is not 
a liberty in the sense of an absence of duty to seek religious truth. It is rather 
a citizen’s right qua citizen to immunity from coercion by individuals, groups, 
or the State as regards one’s religious beliefs and acts (with the proviso that the 
religiously motivated acts in question do not violate public order). "e right 
does not just concern direct coercion: while DH no.2 states that all men are to 
be immune from coercion “in such wise that no one is to be forced to act in a 
manner contrary to his own beliefs,” the section goes on to state that neither is 
anyone “to be restrained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs, whether 
privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due 
limits.”25 Neither is the substance of this right exhausted by the good of autonomy 
simpliciter. Instead, correlative to the right to religious freedom is the duty to seek 
the truth in religious matters in order to form true judgments of conscience (DH 
no.3).26 Underlying this right-duty correlation is the basic goodness of religion as 
something fundamentally worthwhile and ful#lling. DH no.2 understands the 
 23 Regan, Con ict and Consensus, 78.
 24 Pohlschneider, “Declaration on Christian Education,” 11. Pohlschneider cites sections 1, 2 
and 14, but not section 5.
 25 Emphasis added. Dulles puts these points thus: “"e Council avoided teaching that anyone 
can have an objective right to do something that is objectively wrong. Religious freedom, strictly 
speaking, is not a right to do anything. In technical terms it is not a ius agendi but a ius exigendi – 
a right to make a demand on the state. Negatively, it is a right not to be coerced in one’s religious 
life unless one is jeopardizing public order. Positively, it is a right to be supported in one’s quest 
to know religious truth and live accordingly.” Avery Dulles, “Dignitatis Humanae and the 
Development of Catholic Doctrine,” in Catholicism and Religious Freedom, 58. 
 26 "e articulation of this duty by Bishop Ancel of Lyons greatly impressed Pope Paul VI at 
the time of the conciliar debates, and was to in!uence the understanding of the right in the #nal 
text of DH. See Nicholas J. Healy, “"e Dra$ing of Dignitatis Humanae,” in Freedom, Truth, 
and Human Dignity: "e Second Vatican Council’s Declaration on Religious Freedom, ed. David L. 
Schindler and Nicholas J. Healy (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2015), 227-228.
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good as concerning the seeking of religious truth, the adhering to religious truth, 
and the ordering of one’s whole life in accordance with the demands of religious 
truth. On this basis DH no.3 reasons that since religious acts - whereby men 
direct their lives towards God - transcend the order of terrestrial and temporal 
a!airs, the State therefore “ought indeed to take account of the religious life 
of the people and show it favour, since the function of government is to make 
provision for the common welfare.” DH no.6 adds that because the protection 
and promotion of inviolable human rights is an essential duty of the State, the 
State is to safeguard the religious freedom of all of its citizens. It is in this context 
that DH no.6 a"rms that the State is to “help create conditions favourable to 
the fostering of religious life, in order that the people may be truly enabled to 
exercise their religious rights and to full their religious duties.” 
DH’s a"rmation of religion as something fundamentally important 
to individuals and society has two important implications for the present 
investigation. First, since favouring and fostering religion is an aspect of 
protecting both the right to religious freedom (DH no.6) and the common 
welfare (DH no.3), it militates against a minimalist understanding of what 
constitutes a restraint on one’s acting in accordance with one’s religious beliefs. 
Secondly, DH clearly disavows a neutralist understanding of the right to religious 
freedom of the kind endorsed by political liberals like John Rawls. According 
to Rawls’ political conception of justice, the State must not favour any of the 
various competing “comprehensive” doctrines of the good, i.e. philosophically 
robust and thus inevitably contestable understandings of what constitutes the 
good or moral life. $is neutrality is warranted in the following way. $e basic 
rights and liberties of a just constitutional regime have the purpose of assuring 
that citizens can adequately develop the “two moral powers” (one of which is a 
capacity to choose among conceptions of the good)27 that constitute them as 
“free and equal.”28 In determining the content and scope of rights and liberties, 
a just constitutional arrangement permits only “public” justications, which 
are justications arrived at through an “overlapping consensus” concerning a 
conception of justice. Since society is marked by an ineliminable pluralism of 
comprehensive doctrines, public justication via overlapping consensus must 
not aim to advance or be based on any comprehensive doctrine – otherwise 
consensus would not be achieved, and the justication would fail the test of 
reciprocity which governs the relationship between citizens as free and equal. 
Hence justice requires neutrality towards doctrines of the good. 
 27 $e other being a capacity for a sense of justice. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005), 19.
 28 Ibid., 202.
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Note that the very justication for giving priority to neutrality of justication 
in the public life of the State, with citizens as “free and equal” constituted by a 
moral power to choose among conceptions of the good, reveals a pre-eminent - 
and very much “comprehensive”29 - concern for the good of individual autonomy 
in choosing and pursuing ends. So Rawlsian rights and liberties are based on 
the idea of autonomy as an ultimate good, as independent of and prior to any 
purported duty to seek either the truth or what is truly good. Rawlsian neutrality 
thus supports a liberty right to freedom of conscience in the sense of the absence 
of any kind of duty to conform one’s intellect and conscience to religious 
truths. As such, political liberalism approximates to an idea the Council Fathers 
emphatically rejected in draing DH, that of “indi!erentism” towards religion.30 
By enjoining the State to refrain from the furtherance of some denite 
conception of religion it becomes exceedingly di"cult to justify any kind of 
State favouring or facilitating of religion through the educational system. John 
Courtney Murray’s di"culties in this regard illustrate the point in a strictly 
theological context,31 while Rawls and his followers can only contemplate 
support for the public funding of faith schools for political or civic ends.32 
Conversely, when religion as a basic and public good is a"rmed, and thus State 
neutralism towards religion is rejected (as it is in DH), it becomes di"cult to 
justify the claim that the State has no obligation to favour or facilitate religion 
through the educational system. A functioning State will inevitably have an 
educational system, and a thoroughly “neutral” stance towards the good of 
 29 Rawls argues that this underlying value of autonomy is not comprehensive in nature 
because (a) it is not in itself a fully worked out doctrine of the good, and (b) it derives from an 
overlapping consensus on its central importance for justice as fairness. #erefore, he argues, it 
is a political rather than a religious or philosophical good. As to (a), a specic, discrete idea can 
be comprehensive (i.e., philosophically thick) without amounting to an overarching network 
of ideas; as to (b), while there may be an overlapping consensus as to its importance for justice, 
there is no overlapping consensus as to why it is so or as to its proper role and scope within justice 
(therefore this “overlapping consensus” is an unsure foundation for determining constitutional 
particulars). 
 30 For examples of statements attacking “indierentism” made by in$uential voices like those 
of Msgr. De Smedt, Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI in debates over religious freedom around 
the time of the Council, see Alberigo, History of Vatican II, 1:436-440; 3:284-286; 4:108, 541. 
 31 See Todd David Whitmore, “Immunity of Empowerment? John Courtney Murray and the 
Question of Religious Liberty,” Journal of Religious Ethics 21, no.2 (1993): 269.
 32 Rawls does not oer any conclusive answer as to whether it is permissible for faith schools 
to be publicly funded on such grounds. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 199-200. Stephen Macedo 
argues against the public funding of faith schools. Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic 
Education in a Multicultural Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 
240-245.
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religion therein is virtually impossible.33 Since the good of religion concerns the 
meaning of ultimate truth and the conforming of one’s life to such truth, schools, 
operating as vehicles for the transmission of worthwhile knowledge and the 
formation of good character, appear to be an especially suitable mechanism for 
the transmission of religious truth and the formation of religious consciences. 
So once public order is respected and freedom of religion guaranteed by the 
religion-assisting arrangement, no countervailing reason of principle suggests 
itself which would challenge the existence of an obligation on the State to favour 
and facilitate religion through the education system. 
Evolution of DH no.5
So the internal logic of DH’s stance on the role of the State vis-à-vis religion 
undermines the position of those who argue that DH no.5 merely permits the 
State to fund faith schools on the grounds that State neutralism towards religion 
is permissible. Added to this are a number of noteworthy amendments made to 
the text of DH during the conciliar debates. Schema no.2 merely contained the 
following on the matter: “e Church defends man’s right … to order his entire 
life according to the demands of his religion, in matters familial, educational, 
cultural, social, and charitable, as well as in other activities of human life.”34 With 
schema no.3 came a much more focused statement of the religious freedom of 
the family in the context of education: “Parents also have the right to determine 
the way in which religious instruction will be handed on to their children. In 
addition, public powers must acknowledge the right of parents to choose with 
true freedom among schools or other means of education. Unjust burdens must 
 33 A State decision not to express favour for religion or facilitate it through the education 
system would inevitably imply and almost certainly presuppose a number on non-neutral 
propositions, viz.: (a) the judgment that religious teaching is unt for a school setting; (b) the 
judgment that even if the truth claims of one religion or atheism are ultimately true, these truths 
are insu$ciently important to warrant being communicated in a public environment dedicated 
to the communication of important truths; (c) following (b), the implicit judgment that there 
is probably no way of rationally deciding whether or not the respective truth claims are in fact 
true or false (because if rational decision in this manner were possible then judgment (b) would 
appear extremely curious); and (d) the judgment that teaching the truth concerning a religious 
or an a-religious worldview, as distinct from reporting on the contents of the respective beliefs, is 
a very signicant threat to important goods (e.g. public order, or civic training, or the equal and 
fair treatment of students, etc.). 
 34 Healy, “e Dra%ing of Dignitatis Humanae,” 267. Healy very helpfully provides the full 
texts of DH’s various schemata, including a line-by-line comparative analysis of the third schema 
and the nal text.
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not be placed upon them on account of this freedom of choice.”35 To this schema 
no.4 added that “the civil power violates the rights of parents if it imposes a 
single system of education that excludes all religious formation.”36 Schema no.5 
expanded the last sentence to read: “e civil power violates the rights of parents 
if it forces their children to attend lessons that are at odds with the religious 
beliefs of their parents, or if a single system of education is imposed that excludes 
all religious formation.”37 With the nal text came an important clarication on 
the nature of what DH no.5 understands as “unjust burdens”: they may not be 
imposed, “whether directly or indirectly.” 
roughout the conciliar debates, then, there was a clear trajectory in favour 
of a greater and greater realization of parental religious authority in the eld of 
education and schools. e Fathers did not consider it su#cient that section no.5 
denounces thse State imposition of unjust burdens on parents exercising their 
freedom of choice as regards schools; they wanted to make it clear that the State 
can place unjust burdens on parents not only directly - as with the direct imposition 
of a registration fee - but also indirectly. Omitting to fund faith schools, when State 
schools are funded, is an obvious example of the imposition of an indirect burden 
on parents seeking the former kind of school. For parents in this category who are 
not very wealthy - the overwhelming majority - the omission of funding for faith 
schools means that they do not have “a genuinely free choice of schools.” Such an 
omission means that they are “restrained from acting in accordance with [their] 
own beliefs … publicly … in association with others.” As such the burden is indeed 
unjust. 
Considering the text, context and dra"ing of both DH no.5 and DH as a whole, 
as well as those aspects of GE which directly pertain to the question at hand, it 
is reasonable therefore to conclude that DH no.5 entails a duty upon States to 
publicly fund faith schools. So the best interpretation of DH is not that it leaves 
the matter underdetermined, as Alberigo, Regan and Hittinger suggest; nor that it 
does not contain such a duty, as George, Saunders and Gros imply in their respective 
ways; but that it contains an implicit yet real endorsement of the duty of States to 
publicly fund faith schools, a duty which Pavan’s interpretation of DH no.5 perhaps 
elliptically recognizes and which Canavan’s and Siebenrock’s interpretations also 
tentatively acknowledge. is being the case, DH is consistent not only with those 
articles of international human rights law that provide for freedom of religion, but 
also with those articles that provide for parental choice in religious education.38 
 35 Ibid., 396.
 36 Ibid., 327.
 37 Ibid., 355.
 38 E.g., Article 2 of the Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
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Parental Authority and the Duty to Divest of Control of Schools
 e question that has been the focus of this paper up to now is important for 
its own sake, for it concerns an issue of live relevance to Christian parents the 
world over seeking to educate their children in a faith school. But, at this moment 
in time, the question also bears upon a matter of direct practical relevance to a far 
narrower category involving the Irish Church and perhaps the Maltese Church, 
and a few others besides (which is not to say that the matter is not of very 
signi"cant interest to theologians engaged with the questions of Church-State 
relations, freedom of religion, and pluralism). e question is whether there is 
anything in DH to suggest that Church bodies or patrons have a duty to divest 
themselves of control of their schools to the State in certain circumstances? 
Prompting the question in the minds of the authors is the current situation in 
the Republic of Ireland whereby 89% of primary schools are controlled by the 
Catholic Church39 in an increasingly secularized society. e relative number of 
unbelievers is almost certainly on the increase and is especially pronounced in 
large urban centres. e widening discrepancy between the patronage of Irish 
primary schools and the religious demography of Irish society has led to political 
and cultural pressure on faith schools. e issue at the centre of the debate is 
that a subset of secular-minded parents (whether atheist, agnostic, or in some 
other way secularist) judge it unfair that they have no choice but to send their 
children to schools whose ethos they either do not share or reject outright. eir 
objection does not lie with their children having to attend classes devoted to 
religious formation and instruction - all parents have the right under Irish law 
to remove their children from particular classes - but with having to send their 
children to schools with an objectionable religious ethos permeating the entirety 
of the school day. 
In the explicitly political context this pressure has translated into two broad 
proposals to deal with the objections of the parents in question. One is that 
the State assumes direct and complete control over all publicly funded primary 
schools, meaning that there would no longer be any publicly funded faith schools. 
 is proposal is advanced by Atheist Ireland, among others, and would require a 
constitutional referendum to be e#ected.40 If the argument of this paper heretofore 
is sound such a proposal would con$ict with DH no.5 since it manifestly denies 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and Article 18(4) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.
 39 http://www.catholicbishops.ie/2011/04/06/6-april-2011-catholic-schools-republic-
ireland.
 40 Articles 42 and 44 of the Irish Constitution presuppose that the State has a duty to fund 
primary level faith schools. 
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any duty on the part of the State to fund faith schools. e other proposal is that 
the Church divests itself of control of some of its schools to meet the wishes of 
secular-minded parents where a sucient level of demand exists for schools with 
a more secular ethos. is proposal is currently the more politically popular at 
the present time (though Irish political life is undergoing rapid change) and is 
supported by a number of senior Catholic bishops, including the Archbishop of 
Dublin, Diarmuid Martin.41 However, for a variety of reasons, eorts to divest 
of control of Catholic schools have generally been resisted by patrons and other 
stakeholders (including parents and local politicians). Complicating matters 
further are the actions of the previous Government to partially restrict the control 
which faith schools have over their employment decisions42 and the protection of 
their own ethos,43 actions that were not opposed by any of the opposition parties at 
the time. With this complicated political context in mind, stakeholders in Catholic 
education may well wonder whether the support given by members of the Catholic 
hierarchy in Ireland to the proposal that the Church divests itself of control of 
some of its primary schools amounts to an erroneous judgment, one formed more 
by a politically expedient concern to prevent further State encroachment into 
Catholic education than by a principled and faithful concern for the relevant rights, 
obligations and freedoms of all individuals and groups aected by the proposal. In 
particular, some may wonder whether the proposals pay insucient regard to the 
importance of Catholic education and the rights of Catholic families to receive a 
Catholic education. It is quite possible that these lines of thinking have formed 
part of the resistance to the project of divestment. 
In considering what guidance DH may oer for religious and civic leaders in 
addressing this question, it is important to acknowledge that there is no evidence 
to suggest that the precise matter was seriously contemplated by the Fathers at 
the Council or that the text of DH has anything direct or explicit to say on it. 
Nevertheless, DH certainly does deal with religious freedom in the context of 
schools so it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that it contains principles relevant 
to the topic and from which more specic norms could be derived to provide 
helpful and perhaps even decisive guidance.
 41 http://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-aairs/church-dragging-its-feet-over-divestment-
process-martin-1.2422751, Accessed April 26, 2016.
 42 In relation to the amendment of sec. 37 of the Employment Equality Act,e 1998 by sc. 11 of 
the Equality (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2015. 
 43 In relation to the deletion of Rule 68 of the Rules for National Schools by the Minister for 
Education by way of circular letter of January 2016 (the signicance of which is more normative 
than legal). ere is also growing political pressure for restricting the control faith schools have 
over their own admissions policies.
60 MELITA THEOLOGICA
It is rst important to gain clarity on the primary justication for the position 
DH no.5 takes on school choice as regards religion education. An earlier section 
of this paper examined DH no.5 in the context of the document as a whole, and 
in particular in relation to the call by DH for the State to favour and facilitate 
religion. #ere, the point was not to imply that DH no.5 itself receives its 
exclusive warrant from the State promotion of religion, but instead to undercut 
those objections to the idea of a State duty to publicly fund faith schools which 
are based on a neutralist conception of the State’s role vis-à-vis religion. As it 
happens, DH no.5 is primarily sourced not in the good of religion exclusively, 
but in the good of parental authority over the child’s religious education, which 
is a good emanating from the interaction between the good of religion and the 
good of family life, as an independent type of society central to human well-
being: “Since the family is a society in its own original right, it has the right freely 
to live its own domestic religious life under the guidance of parents. Parents, 
moreover, have the right to determine, in accordance with their own religious 
beliefs, the kind of religious education that their children are to receive.” It is 
as a consequence of these considerations that the State “must acknowledge the 
right of parents to make a genuinely free choice of schools and of other means 
of education.” Compared to some other contested questions of justice explored 
by the natural law tradition, the basis and value of parental authority over one’s 
child has been somewhat neglected. e recent work of the philosopher Melissa 
Moschella lls an important lacuna in this regard.44 Moschella explains that 
authority exists at the service of the common good, and that one’s authority 
$ows from the nature and content of one’s special obligations to pursue and 
promote that good. Relationships trigger special obligations insofar as they 
involve potential dependence between those in the relationships, while personal 
relationships create personal obligations which can only be truly fullled by 
certain persons particularly related to the obligee.45 Since human persons are 
intrinsically bodily beings - holistic unities of mind and body - the biological 
parent-child relationship is a personal relationship. It therefore carries with it 
personal obligations that can only be truly fullled by the parents; the child’s 
 44 Melissa Moschella, To Whom do Children Belong? Parental Rights, Civic Education, and 
Children’s Autonomy (Cambridge, forthcoming 2016), and Melissa Moschella, “Natural Law, 
Parental Rights and Education Policy,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 59, no. 2 (2014): 197.
 45 To clarify, a shop assistant has a duty of sorts to serve a customer, but it is a professional 
rather than a personal duty since it does not matter to the customer which shop assistant serves 
her (or if it does, it matters for reasons of professional competence). It is dierent if a husband 
promises his wife that he will take her to dinner for their anniversary: the promise creates a duty 
which can only be fullled personally. 
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need for protection, love and identity is the need for personal and, in the rst 
instance, parental protection and love (and the identity which is fostered by this 
care and connection). (If, for whatever reason, the specically parental form of 
care is lost, it amounts to an important rather than incidental loss.) us, parents 
have a prior duty towards their children, prior to any duty of the State in this 
regard, a duty that grounds their parental authority and parental rights. Parents 
are therefore primarily responsible for their children’s education, a moral norm 
unaltered by the comprehensive ways in which the State itself has a (subsidiary) 
duty to facilitate children’s education. Moschella’s natural law approach mirrors 
that of GE no.3: “Since parents have conferred life on their children, they have 
a most solemn obligation to educate their ospring. Hence, parents must be 
acknowledged as the rst and foremost educators of their children.”46 
DH no.5 makes it clear that parental authority over the religious education 
of children is the governing principle for religious freedom in the schools and 
educational context, and also makes it clear that from it is derived the right of 
parents to a genuinely free choice of schools. If this specic good were lost sight 
of or downplayed there would appear to be very good grounds for supposing 
that the good of religion simpliciter could be legitimately furthered through a 
publicly funded educational system that is thoroughly religious in character (i.e. 
one ultimately controlled by the Church or one permeated by a clear theistic 
ethos). is is the position that George, Saunders, and John Finnis take while 
considering DH. It was earlier stated that George and Saunders consider it 
merely permissible for the State to fund faith schools, yet they also consider 
it permissible (though, again, not required) that all State-funded schools 
teach and profess religious faith or at least some version of theism (with the 
qualication that the religious freedom of dissenting children and families be 
suitably respected).47 Similarly, as part of a philosophical investigation into the 
interrelationship between religion and the State which makes extensive use 
of DH, Finnis argues that the State-favouring of religion can be achieved “by 
requiring or permitting the teaching and profession of religious faith in state-run 
or state-funded schools (with suitable opt-outs to preserve religious liberty).”48 
Each author treats the issue from the perspective of how the State may favour 
the good of religion. And while each author qualies his position by including 
within it the need to respect religious freedom in the event that the hypothetical 
 46 See also Amoris Laetitia, no.84. 
 47 George and Saunders, “Dignitatis Humanae: e Freedom of the Church and the 
Responsibility of the State,” 11. 
 48 John Finnis, “Religion and State,” in Religion and Public Reasons: Collected Essays of John 
Finnis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 5:101.
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scenario obtains, it seems that the aspect to the good of religion foremost in 
their thinking is religion as concerned with objective, ultimate truth about God 
and the cosmos, as distinct from religion as involving the personal (and thus 
also parental) seeking of, adhering to, and ordering of one’s life in conformity 
with this truth.49 If the latter aspect to religion were brought more into focus 
then the relevance of parental authority and educational rights to the question 
at hand would become more apparent. Under the proposal the authors envisage 
as entirely permissible, however, there would be little or no genuine freedom of 
school choice available for parents - every publicly funded school would either 
profess some prescribed religious faith or teach some particular form of theism. 
Like most examinations into the specic matter, George, Saunders and 
Finnis deal with it only very brie"y. So in order to develop the present analysis 
it is necessary to consider some possible arguments in support of their position. 
For a start it could be pointed out that, under the arrangement they deem 
unproblematic, no child would be forced to attend religious instruction, and 
therefore the right to religious freedom is not seriously threatened. But opt-outs 
like this are really directly relevant to only one aspect of the right to religious 
freedom protected by DH, namely the right to immunity from being coerced 
to act in a manner contrary to one’s religious beliefs. (#e right here operates to 
protect parents and their children from having to attend religious instruction or 
formation; appealing to it should not imply that such instruction or formation 
is necessarily in any way coercive itself.) Opt-outs like these do little to give 
expression to the other aspect of the right to religious freedom, namely the 
right not to be restrained from acting in accordance with one’s religious beliefs, 
subject to the demands of public order, a right inherent within the right of 
parents “to determine, in accordance with their own religious beliefs, the kind of 
religious education that their children are to receive.” To this it may be objected 
that an immunity, on the part of the individual, from being restrained in acting 
in accordance with one’s religious beliefs cannot so easily translate into an 
obligation on the part of the State to publicly fund activities in accordance with 
one’s religious beliefs: a right to wear a cross in public does not translate into a 
State obligation to subsidise the purchase of crosses. But this objection loses its 
force in a context where the State has a duty to fund a public good (education 
within schools); has a duty to facilitate and favour a good which may in principle 
 49 #e objective and subjective aspects to the good of religion are thoroughly integrated, as 
Finnis properly notes in the concise outline of the good in his seminal work. See John Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, 2011), 89-90. #e subjective aspect to the 
good of religion is not exhausted by reference to personal authenticity in religious matters but, in 
the fullest sense of religion, includes also the good of friendship with God.
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be promoted as part of the public good in question (religion); and where parental 
choice as regards children’s religious education is a principle directly relevant to 
decisions over how to calibrate the funding of this public good.
It could also be argued that elevating parental choice over the teaching of 
theism or a particular religious faith in all State-funded schools promotes in 
its own way indierentism and neutralism, at least as a side-eect. For it may 
seem that the stance in favour of parental choice as regards children’s education 
can also be justied by insisting solely upon the value of parental autonomy, 
and by neglecting the importance of truth in matters religious. Yet, even if this 
overlapping consensus does exist, it is still the case that at least one genuine 
justication for the position is perfectly compatible with the good of religion 
and presupposes the good of parental authority, particularly as regards religious 
matters. Just as the right to religious freedom contained within DH does not 
amount to an endorsement of indierentism or neutralism, neither does its 
support for parental choice in education collapse into a relativistic or agnostic 
view of religious truth. DH does not elevate parental choice concerning religious 
education above religion. Rather, the good of parental religious authority is 
derived from the good of religion itself (as well as the goods of marriage and 
parental authority),50 meaning that parental authority in matters religious is 
an aspect of the good of religion and is not prioritized over it. Furthermore, 
while it has been conceded above, arguendo, that a heavily autonomist ethics 
might support a right to parental choice as regards religious education, in 
reality any such ethics will struggle to accommodate a strong insistence upon 
religious educational choice above choice of schools according to other potential 
categories. 
#ere is another, more pragmatic consideration which tells against the idea 
of an exclusively theistic or religious model of State-funded schools being a 
legitimate alternative to a model of public funding designed to facilitate parental 
choice. #e former proposal would generate very signicant practical problems 
in relation to facilitating mass conscientious opt-outs in a predominantly 
atheistic or agnostic society, as well as generating the likely side-eect of a more 
entrenched hostility towards religion. #is consideration poses no comparable 
problems for a model of public funding designed to facilitate parental choice. 
 50 As with Gaudium et Spes, no.48, Finnis and George both understand the good of marriage 
as including the generation and education of children. See, e.g., John Finnis, “Sex and Marriage: 
Some Myths and Reasons,” in Human Rights and the Common Good: Collected Essays of John 
Finnis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3:362, and Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, 
Conjugal Union: What Marriage Is and Why it Matters (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 47.
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Admittedly this latter model will not be able to accomodate all parents. In 
practice, for some parents it would be unfeasible to send their child to a school 
whose ethos they share more or less fully. For example, a lack of similarly minded 
parents in their own locality may render the distance to their nearest preferred 
school an insurmountable obstacle. But there is no reason to think that this 
negative side-eect is not proportionate to what this model does achieve in terms 
of religious freedom and parental choice. e model also coheres with the sort 
of pluralism and concern for subsidiarity so central to modern Catholic social 
teaching. Among the various intermediate social groups that stand in the way 
of a statist monism, the family is in many ways the most important (GE appeals 
to both the principle of subsidiarity [GE no.3 and no.5] and pluralism [GE 
no.5 and no.7] in explaining the duty of the State to facilitate parental choice as 
regards schools). 
Acceptance of the above lines of argument is still potentially consistent with 
the proposal that all State schools (as distinct from all State-funded schools) 
not only may but even ought to teach theism or a particular religious faith as 
true (for the sake of religious truth, not some ulterior rationale). Once parents 
seeking public funding for schools with an alternative religious or philosophical 
ethos are su#ciently accommodated, a theistic model of State education does 
not con$ict with parental choice. Just how permissible or mandatory is this 
model is a question which the present study does not address directly. It su#ces 
to note here that while GE no.1 a#rms the right of children and young people to 
“know and love God more adequately,” and, on the back of that right, “earnestly 
entreats all who exercise government over peoples or preside over the work 
of education to see that youth is never deprived of this sacred right,” it does 
not propose that the teaching of religious faith or theism by State schools is a 
necessary mechanism for protecting it. Instead, stress is placed on the right to 
parental choice as regards religious education (GE nos.3, 6 and 7). So in stating 
that “the Council insisted that all schools, secular as well as religious, must 
incorporate moral and religious instruction,” Don Briel is incorrect in so far as he 
is implying that GE requires State schools to teach a particular religion as true.51 
Against this it may be argued that the right to religious freedom in DH implies 
a jurisdictional limit rather than an epistemic limit on behalf of the State, and 
that, so long as the coercive, jurisdictional limit is not transgressed, it behoves 
the State to in some way honour religious truth in that one area of its operation 
where truth and knowledge are its central concerns. Yet, a State that respects the 
 51 Don J. Briel, “e Declaration on Christian Education, Gravissimum Educationis,” in 
Vatican II: Renewal within Tradition, ed. Matthew L. Lamb and Matthew Levering (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 388.
Public Funding and Divesting of Faith Schools – Conway  and Finegan 65
right to parental choice contained within DH no.5 and GE nos.3 and 6 already 
gives honour to the good of religion. What can be said is that a State cannot 
reconcile its duty to facilitate and favour religion with permitting the teaching 
of atheism or agnosticism by its own schools.
Up to now this section has oered a critique of the view that, for the purpose 
of advancing the good of religion, including the good of religious freedom, 
an exclusively theocentric system of publicly funded schools is a legitimate 
alternative to a model of public funding based on genuine parental choice. is 
critique, if sound, serves only to emphasize that safeguarding parental choice as 
regards religious education is neither a superogatory addendum to respect for 
the right to religious freedom, nor a measure inimical to the good of religion. 
Proposing a plausible DH-based argument in favour of a duty of the Irish Church 
(or Irish Church bodies) to divest themselves of the patronage of some schools in 
favour of the State (or some other secular type patron) requires establishing two 
further elements. e rst is whether the right to parental educational choice 
in DH no.5 protects the religious interests of not only non-Christian parents 
but secularist parents too. ere is a fairly clear answer to this. e very raison 
d’être for DH was to oer forthright conciliar recognition to the right of all 
persons to religious freedom, regardless of their religious beliefs. In its focal sense 
“religious belief ” covers religious belief in a particular religion, but it can also be 
understood as including philosophical belief about religion(s): a conscientious 
judgment against the truth of even all religions can still be legitimately described 
as a religious judgment and as the basis of a religious-type belief. DH does not 
restrict the right to religious freedom to the former category - in fact, to make 
just this point, its subtitle employs the phrase: “On the right of the person and 
of communities to social and civil freedom in matters religious.”52 e matter 
is complicated a little by the need to distinguish between religious belief - 
which DH does not tie to an a$rmative belief in God - and “religious acts” and 
“religious life” - which DH does source in faithfulness to God (e.g. DH nos.3, 
4 and 6). DH no.5 incorporates both “domestic religious life” and “religious 
belief ” as part of its justication for parental choice as regards children’s religious 
education. Ultimately, though, it is the good of parental authority in the context 
of the right to religious belief that plays a more direct justicatory role for the 
right to parental choice (and, in any event, the right of the family to “live its own 
domestic religious life under the guidance of parents” surely applies in principle 
to the protection of atheist or agnostic parents from unjust incursions into their 
 52 A number of commentators note this, e.g., Pavan, “Declaration on Religious Freedom,” 69, 
and Gros, “Dignitatis Humanae,” 180.
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domestic sphere by a zealously theocratic State). And while it is true that DH 
no.5 does speak of the right to determine the “religious education” of children 
- a term which appears di#cult to reconcile with either “secularist education” 
or “humanist education” - the particular socio-political context in which the 
conciliar Fathers found themselves meant that the protection of the freedom of 
religious believers against the totalizing tendencies of modern secular States was 
to be at the forefront of their collective consciousness (the last line of DH no.5, 
which criticises the imposition of a single system of education upon all and from 
which all religious formation is excluded, is a reference to Marxist States).53 So 
it seems that the principles operative in DH no.5 include atheistic and agnostic 
parents within the ambit of parental choice over schools, notwithstanding the 
fact that these parents have reached or assimilated false conclusions about the 
nature of God and ultimate reality. It is worth recalling here that, in a#rming 
parental choice as regards religious education, GE no.6 appeals to “conscience” 
and does not propose to limit the liberty to Christian or otherwise religious 
parents. 
It still remains to be shown that not only the State but the Church too has 
a responsibility for facilitating parental choice as regards schools. Showing this 
requires distinguishing among di"erent understandings of what “facilitating” 
may mean in this context. Obviously the Church has no duty to facilitate 
parental choice if by “facilitate” is meant the establishment, management and 
funding of every school type necessary to adequately ful#l reasonable parental 
demand across all of society. At the same time the Church quite obviously 
has an obligation to facilitate the wishes of Catholic parents by doing what it 
reasonably can to meet their requests for truly Catholic schools (GE preface 
and no.3 are clear on this obligation). But can it be said that the Church has 
some kind of responsibility for facilitating the parental choices of secularist 
parents in this context? DH restricts the religious freedom question to persons 
qua citizens in civil society, as distinct from persons qua members or potential 
members of the Church, meaning that the right to religious freedom in DH 
does not serve to nullify individual Catholics’ responsibilities towards the 
Church.54 But the right to religious freedom contained within DH applies to 
the Church’s interactions with persons qua members of civil society on account 
of the Church’s co-responsibility for the common welfare. So immediately 
 
 53 Regan, Con!ict and Consensus, 125.
 54 According to DH no.1, “Religious freedom … has to do with immunity from coercion in 
civil society. $erefore, it leaves untouched traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of 
men and societies towards the true religion and towards the one Church of Christ.”
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following the enumeration of the right to parental choice in the schooling of 
children, DH no.6 posits:
#e common welfare of society consists in the entirety of those conditions of social 
life under which men enjoy the possibility of achieving their own perfection in 
a certain fullness of measure and also with some relative ease. Hence this welfare 
consists chie"y in the protection of the rights, and in the performance of the 
duties, of the human person. #erefore, the care of the right to religious freedom 
devolves upon the people as a whole, upon social groups, upon government, and 
upon the Church and other religious Communities, in virtue of the duty of all 
towards the common welfare, and in the manner proper to each.
#e Church has a duty of care towards the right to religious freedom; it is not 
solely a competence of the State. #is duty of care devolves upon the Church in 
a manner proper to it. #is duty relates to the right to religious freedom, a right 
which involves the right to genuine parental choice as regards children’s religious 
schooling, and is a right which inheres in parents regardless of their religious beliefs. 
Can it therefore be said that the Church’s duty may, in particular circumstances, 
translate into a duty to divests itself of a Catholic school in favour of some other 
patron for the sake of parental freedom of choice as regards children’s schooling? 
#e particular circumstances in mind involve situations where a locality contains 
a clearly disproportionate number of Catholic schools relative to the demographic 
level of Catholic or otherwise religious parents, where it can be established that 
there is strong parental demand to have a school with some kind of secular ethos, 
where the transferring of patronage of a designated school from the Church to some 
other patron would not signicantly infringe upon the parental rights of Catholics 
or other believers in the locality, and where there is no signicant shortage of 
school places within the locality requiring the State to establish a school in order to 
discharge its obligations towards providing children with a basic level of education. 
Considering the analysis of DH hitherto undertaken, it would seem that in these 
circumstances it is not only permissible for the Church to so divest itself of control 
of the designated school but that in fact it morally ought to do so. 
To this it may be replied that the primary duty here really belongs to the State - 
that because of its vastly greater resources it is the State’s “proper” role to facilitate 
parents’ wishes by either aiding the establishment by a secular patron of an entirely 
new school in the locality or by establishing its own, new non-denominational 
school. But in facilitating a model of schools respectful of parental choice, the 
State’s primary duty is discharged through administering public funds in support 
of the various patrons’ initiatives. In the given case, if the Church decides not to 
divest itself of patronage it would fall to the State to expend extra public resources 
in acquiring land (in an appropriate area, which may not be practicable) and 
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building a new school in order to vindicate the parental rights at issue, unless 
those parents possess su#cient access to private funds to achieve these measures 
by themselves (which is unlikely). It is di#cult to see how such a decision could 
contribute towards the Church’s mission or its duty towards the common welfare 
- it will merely have delayed and made costlier the vindication of the parents’ 
rights, with the added side-e"ect of raising questions in the minds of reasonable 
members of the public about the Church’s respect for these rights. If the intent 
in declining to divest was to contain these families within the sphere of religious 
in#uence, that in itself would be di!cult to reconcile with the right to freedom 
of religion within DH. Since divesting would be feasible, and would not in itself 
involve assuming a function, like public funding, that properly belongs to the 
State, a decision against it would, it is submitted, amount to a dereliction of 
the Church’s proper share of responsibility towards the common welfare and 
religious freedom. $e Irish Church - in particular Church patrons and others in 
control of Catholic schools - should consider whether particular circumstances 
obtain that may engage a duty to divest. $e duty is not a question of political 
expediency or of avoiding “scandal” in the secular sense of that term, but a matter 
of Catholic principle. 
Conclusion
Because DH leaves this precise matter (regarding the divestment of schools) 
at least partially underdetermined, and because the question involves complex 
issues of contingent fact which the present study can hardly avoid simplifying, 
the conclusion reached here is tentatively proposed. Still, it seems sound. $e 
best interpretation of DH no.5 and its a!rmation of the right to parental choice 
as regards schools, is that it implicitly recognizes a duty on behalf of the State 
to fund faith schools. $is interpretation %ts with both DH’s insistence that the 
State ought to favour and facilitate religion, and also with its understanding of 
religious freedom as including the freedom of non-believers. In turn, because 
of the Church’s duty towards the common welfare and religious freedom, there 
are potential circumstances where it may have a responsibility to divest itself of 
control over some of its schools. 
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